Urban bias has long been China's dominant economic policy. The persistent urban bias leads to a severe rural-urban income gap and diverts physical as well as an effect of diverting the rural resource out of agricultural sector, and thus is detrimental to agricultural growth. This paper uses China's provincial panel data from 1978 to 2007 to investigate the diverting effects of the rural-urban income gap on agricultural growth. The empirical results suggest that the persistent rural-urban income gap caused by urban bias has produced strong current, but smaller lagged resource-diverting effects on agriculture. The further study shows that the diverting effect is decreasing over time and it is larger in the middle provinces than other provinces. The time and region patterns are confirmed to be a "U shape" relationship between the rural-urban income gap and agricultural growth.
Introduction
Since 1978 when the Chinese government launched economic reform, China has experienced outstanding agricultural performance. The gross output value of agriculture in real term grew at a rate of 7.14% per annum, from 139.7 billion yuan in 1978 to 990.5 billion yuan in 2007, and the total grain output grew at an average rate of 1.85% per annum, from 304.8 million tons in 1978 to 501.6 million tons in 2007 (see Table 2 ). Much earlier research has focused on accounting for China's agricultural growth in terms of increasing investment in basic production factors such as land, labour, machine power, fertilizer, institutional transition from the communal system to the household responsibility system (McMillan, et. al., 1989 and Lin, 1992 , the increase in the grain procurement prices (Kueh, 1984) and R&D inputs (Fan and Pardy, 1997) . The institutional benefits of the household responsibility system disappeared as 99% of production teams had adopted this system after 1984 (Lin, 1992) . As the centre of economic reform returned to nonfarm sectors, both the policy makers and economists showed less interest in China's agricultural growth.
One of the important consequences of the rural reform is the reduction of the rural-urban income gap. As shown in graph 1, the rural-urban income gap measured by the ratio of urban resident's real disposable income per capita to rural resident's real net income decreased from 2.57: 1 in 1978 to 1.53: 1 in 1985 and then reached the historically lowest level of 1.51: 1 in
1988.
2 However, this reducing income gap began to re-expand as the centre of economic reform shifted to the nonfarm sectors at the end of 1980s, because the government began to resume its catch up strategy by adopting urban bias policies. It has been shown by Gao and Zheng (2009) that urban bias is the dominant policy choice of governments at all levels under the government-lead economic growth pattern, no matter whether this growth pattern is pursued by central-planned or marketization-oriented economic systems. Urban-biased polices such as the extremely low prices of agricultural products, the discriminative 2 According to the interpretation of National Bureau of Statistics of China on the income indexes, both the incomes of rural and urban resident used here are measured by the net income. The net income of rural resident is the total income minus various costs involved, i.e. the net income of farmer household=the total incomevarious taxes and fees-the costs of agricultural production-the discount of fixed capital used in agricultural production-the expenditures of giving; the net income of urban household is also called the disposable income, which is all the income able to be used for the final consumption, other non-obligatory expenditures and saving, i.e. disposable income=the total income of all family members-the income tax-the personal expenditures on social security-the subsidy of bureau of statistics for the investigated household to record his income and expenditures. This household income is changed into average income by dividing the number of household member. We respectively use the rural CPI and the city CPI to change the nominal terms into the real terms.
registration system (hukou) towards rural migrants and the under investment in agricultural infrastructure may resulted in huge and persistent rural-urban income disparity in China (Yang, 1999; Lu and Chen, 2004; Cheng and Li, 2007) .
It is admitted that the persistent agricultural growth results in shrinking rural-urban income gap, given the prices of agricultural products and urban residents' income. Behind the agricultural growth is the alleviation of urban bias in the beginning of economic reform. This implies that institutional reform as well as farmers' expectation on higher income goes before the agricultural investment and growth. That is to say, it is farmers' higher income expectation concerning agricultural production that leads to a higher willingness to invest in agriculture and thus higher agricultural growth, which in turn may result in higher farmer income and lower rural-urban income gap, just like what has happened at the beginning of rural reform.
The rural-urban migration enables the farmer to compare incomes from different sectors and difference regions and thus to make an employment decision. Huge rural-urban income gap caused by persistent urban bias undermines agricultural growth in three ways: Firstly, more and more rural people flowing out of the agricultural sector means the loss of agricultural labour force. Secondly, considering that rural migrants have more talent than those who remain behind (eg. younger, well educated, more entrepreneurship as well as higher IQ), this outflow implies not only a physical but also an intellectual loss to the agricultural sector.
Finally, lower income return on agricultural activities also implies weaker incentive for farmers to invest in agricultural infrastructure to improve land quality and to use advanced agricultural technology such as machines and fertilizers. That is to say, not only the government but also the farmers are unwilling to invest in agricultural production.
While this correlation among urban bias, income disparity and agricultural growth seems straightforward, there are seldom effective studies systematically testing it in both the Chinese and western literatures. The term "urban bias" called by Lipton (1977) , was mostly associated with the rural poverty, how it is formed and why it is persistent (also see Binswanger and Deininger, 1997; Majumdar et. al., 2004; Cheng, 2005; Corbridge and Jones, 2005; Dirk and Derek, 2008, Gao and Zheng, 2009) . Other existing literature is mainly focused on the effect of urban bias on the rural-urban income gap in the process of urbanization, finding that urban bias increase the rural-urban income gap (Lu and Chen, 2004; Cheng and Li, 2007) . The first difference of this paper is to extend this literature further to examine the consequences of the inter-sectoral income gap on agricultural growth.
Many studies concern the pattern of income inequality during the process of national economic development (such as Ahluwalia, 1976; Anand and Kanbur, 1993; Nielsen, F. and A. S. Alderson, 1997; Barro, 2000) since Kuznets (1955) 's seminal work showing that the income inequality first increases and then decreases as the economic growth process (i.e. an "inverted U curve" relationship). Other papers study the opposite relationships among which most of them find that the income inequality is adverse to economic growth (see eg. London and Smith, 1988; Clarke, 1992; Alberto and Rodrik, 1994; Aghion et al., 1999) but some find it is not robustly negative in the US data (Panizza, 2002) or is an inverted "U shape" in cross sections but not necessarily in time series (Perotti, 1993) . What is different between this paper and the above papers is that we only consider the case of inter-sectoral income inequality between the rural and urban sectors, and study its effect on agricultural growth, not on total economic growth.
Even though there are plenty of studies on the rural-urban income inequality (see eg. Carter, 1997; Yang and Cai, 1999) , and its relationship with economic growth (Lu, 2002) , and also on the effects of such inequality on the labour reallocation among different sectors (Zhou and Yang, 1999) , there is little discussion on its relationship with agricultural growth. This paper attempts to bridge the relationship between the rural-urban income gap and agricultural growth on the ground that the increasing rural-urban income gap caused by the persistent urban bias policies will divert factors out of agriculture and produce adverse effects on agricultural growth.
We use China's provincial panel data from 1978 to 2007 to test this relationship, finding that the diverting effect of the rural-urban income gap does produce an adverse influence on agricultural growth, no matter whether agriculture is measured by the output value of farming or by the grain output. This pattern of negative relationship remains when we fully consider China's different development periods as well as regional development disparity but varies in the magnitude of its coefficient, and is further confirmed to be a "U shape" relationship. The one-year lagged effect of the income gap is not significant to the output value of farming but is still significantly negative to the grain output. Thus, we find that there is a robust negative relationship between the rural-urban income gap and agricultural growth and rural resources are diverted to the urban sector.
In section 2, we briefly give a profile of China's urban bias, rural-urban income gap and agricultural growth after 1978; Section 3 is the econometric specification where we set up the econometric model, the data, the variables and the econometric methods; Section 4 reports the empirical results given by total provincial panel data since 1978; Section 5 tests the sensitivity of results given by section 4, based on the lagged effect, the time and regional as well as the "U shape" relationship; Section 6 concludes the paper.
China's urban bias, rural-urban income gap and agricultural performance

The persistent urban bias
Urban bias has long been the dominant economic policy in the developing countries (Lipton, 1977; Lipton, 1993; ; and also the review by Corbridge and Jones, 2005 ) and this is not exception in China (Gao et. al., 2009) . 3 During the central planned economy period, the government extracted resources from agriculture by constructing the following supportive institutional systems: the people's communal system to control the process of agrarian production; the state monopoly over purchase and marketing to control the agricultural product market; and the population registration (hukou) system to prohibit migration from country to city (Gao et. al., 2009) . The extreme urban bias leads to severe social problems such as the immiserizing peasantry, the stagnation of agricultural output and the less developed country. In result, the agricultural sector failed to provide the government with sufficient residual resources to preferentially develop the industrial sector and to fulfil the government's objective for catch up.
According to Feng and Li (1993) , the total funds collected from agriculture to support industrial development amounted to 1159.41 billion yuan at the current price from 1952 to 1990, accounting for 27.2% of total national fund collected for industrialization, with a net outflow of resource amount of 952.82 billion yuan. Among government's three methods of collecting agricultural residuals, i.e. the price scissor of industrial-agricultural product, the agricultural tax and the agricultural saving in the state-owned financial system, the price 3 Gao et. al. (2009) also shows that urban bias is the rational choice of government on the ground that(1) the central government once again pursue for catch up strategy which emphasizes on industrial sector as well as total economical growth, (2) and the highly centralized political promotion system guarantees the officials of the local government to follow the central government's strategy, (3) the agriculture sector plays an decreasing role in total economy as economy grows, and (4) the high cost of collective behaviour for the scattered farmers forms less political pressure on the policy making process.
scissor is the dominated method, taking a proportion of 74.8% during the period of 1952 to 1990, while the other two only take 13.1% and 12.1%, respectively.
4
The urban bias policy then tended to be alleviated firstly by transferring the previous communal system to the present household responsibility system and then by gradually opening the food circulating market to the price mechanism. In addition, the rural-urban separated population registration system was loosened to allow farmers to migrate to the cities but without the same rights on the salary and welfare as the urban dwellers. It is noted that the sharing tax system reform initiated in 1994 strengthened the urban biased policies (Gao, 2009) This over centralized financial system reform, in the name of enhancing central government's ability of macro adjustments, increased the ratio of the central government in national financial income while did not correspondingly increase its obligations on developing local economic affairs. In the aftermath of the reform, the local governments were experiencing unexceptional financial deficit, and thus had to implement urban bias policies by levying higher agricultural taxes as well as fees to fund for their expenditures on local economic development. also consider that China is experiencing increasing urban bias. This strengthened urban bias once again resulted in stagnation of agricultural growth, peasantry poverty and less developed country, so called "three agricultural problems", which propelled the central government to abolish agricultural taxes and increase investment in the agricultural sector since 2004. Even so, there is no obvious evidence showing that the local governments are inclined to reduce their urban bias especially when they expropriate farm lands for the nonfarm use.
5
As shown in Table 1 , the data can tell how the urban bias changes since 1978. General speaking, the extent of urban bias is reflected in the relative change of the income collected from the agricultural sector and the expenditure spent on agriculture. On the one hand, the agricultural and relative taxes took an average proportion of 4.9% in the first five year after the reform, and then decreased to 2.9% in the second five year. However, they grew at an extreme high rate of 84.1% in 1994, and accounted for 4.5% in total tax revenue, increasing 1.5 percentage points from 3% in 1993. This reflects that the government strengthened urban 4 The price scissor of industrial-agricultural product refers to the much higher price of industrial product relative to agricultural product. It was firstly adopted by the former Soviet Union and became a dominant approach for the central planned economies to divert the agricultural surplus to the industrial sector.
bias by levying more income from the agricultural sector after the initiation of tax system reform. The income collected from agriculture decreased slightly but still at a relatively high proportion in the aftermath of tax reform. On the other hand, the agricultural expenditure took a decreasing share in total national financial expenditure from 13.4% in 1978 to 6.8% in 2007.
The five average data also showed the same downward trend except in the late 1980s and the early 1990s when the agricultural expenditure has an obvious increase in the total national financial expenditure. We also can tell that this share keeps going down since the tax system reform. Thus, the urban bias relieved at the beginning of the reform while strengthened in the aftermath of tax system reform. 
The increasing rural-urban income gap
It has been shown that the urban biased policies contribute to the evolution of the rural-urban income gap in China (Lu and Chen, 2004; Cheng and Li, 2007) . The alleviation of urban bias always leads to decreasing rural-urban income gap. Graph 1 gives a brief description on the evolution of the real rural-urban income gap after 1978. The real average income of urban resident was 2.57 times to that of rural resident at the beginning of the economic reform, decreased quickly to 1.53 times in 1985, and then arrived at the lowest point of 1.51 times in
1988.
However, as the focus of reform turned to city and nonfarm sectors, the nonfarm sectors grew faster than farm sector. As we have argued above, the strengthened urban bias after the tax system reform has resulted in increasing income gap in the rest period except from 1994 to 1997, when the rural-urban income gap decreased slightly due to the looseness of hukou system, the relative higher price of agricultural products since 1993 (Yang and Cai, 1999) , Behind the dynamics of income gap is the different growth rates of incomes between the rural and urban dwellers. We can tell from graph 1, the rural-urban income gap increased when the income of urban resident grew faster than that of rural resident and otherwise, decreased.
During the period of 1978 to 1988, it is in 9 of the 11 years that the income of rural resident grew faster than that of urban resident and that is why the rural-urban income gap decreased in this period; while during the rest 19 years, only in the year from 1995 to 1997, the rural resident had a higher income growth rate than the urban resident and thus the income gap increased sharply in this period. China's agricultural growth seems to be some kind of miracle in contrast to other developing countries that China has used only less than the world's 7% land to feed the world's 22%
population. It has been concluded that the agricultural growth at the beginning of economic reform attributed mainly to the rural institutional transition as well as the efficient use of agricultural production factors (see Kueh, 1984; McMillan et. al., 1989; Lin, 1992 and .
Indeed, just as shown in Table 2 , the gross output value of agriculture and farming grew at an average rate of 7.14% and 5.47% respectively after 1979. But at different stages, agricultural growth displayed huge differences: much higher at the first four years than the following years.
Behind the total agricultural growth is the increasing input of production factors. General speaking, farmers dramatically increased their investments in chemical fertilizer as well as machinery power, which grew at an average rate of 6.34% and 6.7% respectively, due to the incentive of rural reforms. However, the investments in other factors such labour, total sown area, sown area of grain corps and irrigated area grew at a very low and even negative rate during the 30 years. In contrast to the dramatic growth of the gross output value, the grain output grew at a very limited rate of 1.85% per annum and even at a negative rate of -1.45% during 1998 to 2002. As for the five-year average growth rate, the gross output value of agriculture and farming, the chemical fertilizer and the machinery power grew dramatically while the grain output and other production factors grew at a very low speed. Connecting China's macro-data on urban bias, the rural-urban income gap and the agricultural inputs and growth, we find that in general the alleviation of urban bias will reduce the ruralurban income gap, produce strong incentives for farmers to invest in agriculture and result in 
Econometric specification
Econometric model
Following Lin (1992) and Li and Yang(2005) , the agricultural growth is basically determined by four kinds of production factors: sown areas, labour in the agricultural sector, agricultural machinery power and chemical fertilizer. we assume that the agricultural production takes the form of Cobb-Douglas production function:
where m=1, 2, 3, 4, represents the four major agricultural production factors and β m is the respective production elasticity waiting for estimation here, and a refers to the residual factors influencing the agricultural production. The rural-urban income gap resulting from the urbanbiased economic policies also contributes to produce an adverse effect on agricultural growth, just as illustrated in the second section, by diverting the basic agricultural production factors to nonfarm sectors. Hence, (1) in which g represents the rural-urban income gap; a 1 refers to a in equation (1) minus the effect of the rural-urban income gap; α m , the effect of the income gap on agricultural growth through the above mentioned diverting effects. Considering that (1) land quality also suffers to the diverting effect of income gap and influences on agricultural growth, (2) the financial deficit of local governments may strengthen the "grabbing hand" of the local government on agriculture (Gao, 2009) , (3) and other forms of income source of the local government may alleviate the "grabbing hand" on agriculture, we separate this factors from a 1 in (2) and get,
Where h j represents the financial deficit measuring the grabbing hand of the local government when j=1, and other income sources measuring the alleviation of grabbing hand when j=2; x 5 and β 5 refer to the land quality and its elasticity, and a 2 , the residual factors. Taking logs at both sides of equation (3) and making some adjustments, we can get the linear relationship between the agricultural output and its inputs:
where α m is the resource-diverting effect of the rural-urban income gap; β m is the elasticity of the four major production factors and that of irrigated area before the agricultural resources are diverted by the rural-urban income gap; γ j is the elasticity of "grabbing hand". Hence, the equation (4) where α is equal to the sum of α m , measuring the total diverting effect of the income gap on those five production factors; m ρ =α m +β m , measuring the net effect of the production factors on the agricultural output; β 0 is the constant term and it ε , the residual term. The regional dummy variable, reg k , refers to the west region when k=1, the middle region when k=2 and the east region when k=3, as the benchmark; t is the time-trend term.
Considering that the data of the production factors measured by the gross value are highly correlated but the per-capita measurements can remarkably reduce these correlations, we change the gross variables in equation (5) into the per-capita variables. 6 To be specific, we use the output value of farming per capita (y 1 ) and the grain output per capita (y 2 ) as a proxy for y, in order to investigate the effect of the rural-urban income gap on different measurements of agriculture growth; the measurement of farm land, x 1 , is the sown area per capita (x 11 ) when we explain the output value of farming per capita, and is the grain sown area per capita (x 12 ) when we explain the grain output. The labour variable v, measured by the size of labour working in the agricultural sector, is used to calculate the per-capita value of other variables.
The agricultural machinery power per capita x 2 and the chemical fertilizer per capita x 3 are used to measure the technological progress in China's agriculture as the other two main production factors, and the irrigated area per capita x 4 is used as the proxy for the soil quality.
6 High correlations among explanatory variables can lead to multicollinearity and thus biased estimation of coefficients. The reader can refer to appendix B to see the correlation difference between gross variables and per capita variables. This way of taking per capita measurements to estimate agricultural growth equation is not strange. For example, Akino and Hayami (1974) also used Japanese per capita data from 1880 to 1965 to make growth accounting analysis.
The financial deficit of local government is used to measure the extent of the "grabbing hand" h 1 and the income sources h 2 which are supposed to relieve the "grabbing hand" are measured by the sum of the real FDI and the sales income of commercial houses for the extra income sources may reduce the financial dilemma of local governments. These measurements of the grabbing hand are also calculated into per-capita values using provincial total labour force.
The rural-urban income gap, g, is calculated by the ratio of the disposable average income of urban resident to the average net income of rural resident. All the nominal data are adjusted to the real value in 1978 by CPI. For more details about the variables, please refer to Appendix A.
Data
The data used to measure above variables are from New China 55 Years Compile Statistical for 1978 -2004 and China Statistical Yearbook, 2006 -2008 for 2005 .
Material
Considering that China's big municipalities, such as Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin, are quite different from other provinces in both the industrial and population structure, we exclude the three municipalities from our consideration. Since Chongqing municipality founded in 1996, was a part of Sichuan province before 1996, we, in order to keep the consistency of the data, add Chongqing's data to Sichuan province just as the case before 1996. Another province, Tibet autonomous region, is also not included in our data due to too many missing data.
Hence, we have collected an unbalanced panel data from 1978 to 2007 with a panel of 26 provinces in which some data do not extend through this period. Table 3 provides a brief descriptive statistics of both the total data and regional data due to the remarkable development disparity among three regions in China. 7 What interests us more is the difference of variables among the east, the middle and the west regions. The real output value of farming per capita increases from the poorest west to the most-developed east while the highest grain output per capita is in the middle. The sown area per capita and sown area of grain corps per capita in the middle provinces are higher than the west and east provinces, while the west provinces have the most irrigated area per capita due to the lower intensity of 7 China's provinces have been divided into three regions mainly according to their geographical locations, that is, eastern, middle and western provinces. General speaking, eastern provinces are more developed than middle and western provinces, the least developed areas. The eastern provinces include Liaoning, Hebei, Beijing, Tianjin, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan; Middle provinces are Heilongjiang, Jilin, Neimenggu, Henan, Shanxi, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi and Anhui; The rest provinces, Xinjiang, Ningxia, Gansu, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou and Xizang, belong to western areas. This category is based on the Seven Five Year Plan approved by the 4th session of the 6th National People's Congress in 1986. population in this region. The east region uses more machine power but less fertilizer than the middle.
The east provinces have much more extra sources for financial income than the lessdeveloped middle and west regions (actually near three times to the middle region and four times to the west). Correspondingly, the east region has the lowest level of financial deficit than other regions. This is natural considering that the most-developed region has the most extra income sources and thus enjoys the lowest level of financial deficit. Similarly, the mostdeveloped east has the smallest rural urban income inequality while the poorest west has the largest rural-urban income gap. This brief statistical description shows that the developed region invests more in the production factors and shows lower potential for grabbling hands towards agriculture, and thus enjoys the faster agricultural growth as well as the lower ruralurban income gap. 
Econometric method
The panel data set we constructed has a length of 30 years and 26 panels. In order to get a robust conclusion between the rural-urban income gap and the agricultural growth, we need to consider the estimation problems resulting from both the long time period and panel dimensions. Firstly, the provinces in China's centralized political system have strong interaction effects. Both the competitive and cooperative actions among local governments have been spotted in plenty of works (such as Shen and Dai, 1990; Zhou, 2004; Xu et. al., 2007; Pi, 2008 and Besley, et al., 2005) , which may lead to cross sectional correlations of the panel data. Secondly, the huge development disparity among different provinces easily results in groupwise heteroscedasticity, which means different panel has different residual variance.
Finally, the long period of time in the data may cause the autocorrelation problem. All these potential problems may lead to biased parameter estimations as well as problematic statistical reference. Based on the regression of fixed effect model, the above three problems can be spotted respectively by doing the Pesaran's test for cross sectional independence, the modified Wald test for groupwise heteroscedasticity and the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data. We report these tests in the empirical results and then use "xtpcse" command in STATA to proceed on Prais-Winsten regression, in order to copy with those potential problems. In view of the individual effects of panel data estimation, we take
Hausman test, which is also reported in the empirical results, to choose between random and fixed effect models. Table 4 reports the result of economic estimation of equation (5) by per capita measurements.
Empirical results
The results of fixed effect model are reported in column (1) and (3). At the end of table 4, we have detected the groupwise heteroskedasticity, the cross-sectional dependence as well as the first-order autocorrelation. Thus, we tend to trust the results given by Prais-Winsten regressions in column (2) and (4) which control these problems. The variable we are concerning, the ruralurban income gap produces a significant negative effect on agricultural growth. The total diverting effect of income gap on four production factors is -0.585 when the output value of farming is the dependent variable and -0.444 when the grain output is the dependent variable.
It implies that the rural-urban income gap lead to a reduction of elasticity for each of the four production factors by an average magnitude of -0.146 and -0.111, respectively. This is very strong diverting effect in contrast to the estimated elasticity of those production factors.
Among the four production factors, the sown areas per capita are the most important variable with a net elasticity of 0.49 to the output value of farming per capita and 0.772 to the grain output per capita. The fertilizer seems more important to the grain output than to the output value of farming, with a significant elasticity of 0.131 and the non-significant 0.014, respectively. The machine power does not show significant influence on the output value while produces significantly negative effect on the grain output. The land quality measured by the irrigated area plays a significantly positive role in both cases with an elasticity of around 0.19. The above patterns can easily be understood. Just as we mentioned in part one, the farmers are encouraged to transfer their human and physical capital to those sectors with higher income return. Because the farmland, not like the labour force, cannot be moved away, farmers with more sown area tend to yield more. The fertilizer is also used to substitute the adverse effect of labour outmigration and thus is positive to agricultural production. The negative effect of the machine power may be due to the fact that famers are more likely to use the agricultural machine power as the transportation tool.
The extra income sources and the financial deficit of local government produce opposite effects on agricultural growth, just as we expect. The extra income can alleviate the "grabbing hand" on agriculture while the financial deficit enhances it. These effects are even more significant for the grain output than the output value of farming. In addition, comparing to the east provinces, both the middle and west provinces have a significantly lower level of output value of farming, but only the west provinces have a significantly smaller grain output. This is true considering that both the east and middle provinces are the main grain production regions while the west provinces are not. and 1%, respectively; The null hypotheses of modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in fixed effect regression model, of Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data and of the Pesaran's test of cross sectional independence are "sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i", no first-order autocorrelation and no cross sectional dependence;
The variable of sown area, when the dependent variable is grain output per capita, is sown areas of grain. All variables are taken logs and are measured by per capita value.
Sensitivity
In order to get a robust conclusion on the relationship between the rural-urban income gap and agricultural growth, we continue to retest the results by talking about the endogeneity problem and the lagged effects, shortening the study period and classifying the region. We further find a "U shape" relationship between the rural-urban income gap and agricultural output.
The effect of the past rural-urban income gap on the current agricultural growth
The diverting effect of the rural-urban income gap may not only happens at the current term, but also at the last term, because the farmer always makes the work decision after comparing his income from agriculture with the potential income from the alternative sectors. In China, the rural migrants will provide a reference income for those who remain behind and thus influence their job choices in the next year. We use the last year's rural-urban income gap to substitute the current variable and see whether the results remain the same. In addition,
considering the potential endogeneity due to the causality that the current agricultural growth also results in the change of rural-urban income inequality, the lagged term of the rural-urban income gap may be used to resolve the problem by assuming that current agricultural growth is irrelevant with last term's income gap. 8 The results are presented in the third and sixth column of Table 4 .
The lagged term of income gap does have a significantly negative effect on grain output while a non-significant influence on the output value of farming according to column (6) and (3) in Table 4 , respectively. These imply that the last year's income gap does produce the diverting effect on grain production but not on agricultural value. These may be due to the fact that the farmers can change their farming choice to those able to increase their income. Comparing to the current variable, the lagged term produces a smaller effect on agricultural growth in both cases. This may be partly due to the seasonal fluctuations of labour demand in agricultural production so that the farmers can swift to nonfarm activities as soon as they realize nonfarm employment can earn more, and partly due to the flexible labour supply of household so that the increase of nonfarm labour supply may not squeeze out too many farm labours. Other factors influence agricultural growth at a similar pattern but now both the machine power and the fertilizer have a significantly positive effect on the output value of farming.
The influence of the periods
According to Yang and Cai (1999) 's analysis on the evolution of the rural-urban income gap as well as the pattern shown in graph 1, we divided the time since 1978 into four periods: 1978-1985, 1986-1993, 1994-2002 and 2003-2007 . We only report the results of the last three periods because of the data missing in the first period as well as the fruitful existing study on this period (Such as Kueh, 1984; McMillan et al., 1989; Lin, 1992 and . Table 5 gives the results by periods. The rural-urban income gap still produces persistent significantly negative effects on the output value of farming but with a decreasing magnitude from -0.677 and -0.348 in 1986-94 and 1994-2002, to -0.299 in 2003-07 . The grain output is also subject to this diverting effect but with similar magnitudes among the different periods.
The smaller diverting effect of income gap in the last period may result from the alleviation of the urban bias at the central government level by exempting the agricultural taxes and increasing investments in agriculture since 2003.
The effect of other factors shows some different patterns comparing to those in table 4. The sown area per capita is producing a less and less important influence on the output value of farming by time. The machine power plays an increasing negative role in the output value of farming and a definitely negative role in the grain production but the fertilizer and the land quality play increasingly important role in China's agricultural growth. This can be explained that the high population pressure in China induces famers to take labour-intensive as well as land-intensive technologies such as fertilizer and high-yield corps, just as predicted by the theory of induced technical change and similar to Japanese experience (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985) . The extra income sources of local government only play a significantly positive effect in the first period while no significant effect in the subsequent periods. The "grabbling hand" effect of financial deficit on the output value of farming can only be tested in the first period and this effect on the grain output can be seen in both the first and third period. 
The influence of regions
Since the geographical factor plays a very important role in agricultural performance, we further investigate whether the effect of the rural-urban income gap on agricultural growth is changed with the regional difference. The results by the subsample of three regions are reported in table 6.
The diverting effect of the rural-urban income gap still can be examined among different regions but with different magnitudes. It is shown that the middle provinces suffer the highest diverting effect of the rural-urban income gap among the three regions, with a magnitude of -0.85 to the output value of farming and -0.59 to the grain output. This is true if we consider the fact that the middle provinces such as Hunan, Henan, Hubei, etc., are the major suppliers of labour force for those enterprises in east provinces and that the middle provinces are the major agricultural provinces. The higher is the regional income gap, the stronger incentive for the farmers in the middle to migrate, and the greater is the diverting effect of the income gap on agriculture in the middle provinces. However, this does not mean that the situation of migrant is deteriorating because they can earn a higher income by working in the urban or the east sector. The east provinces are also subject to this diverting effect smaller than the middle provinces but larger than the west provinces. This implies some kind of "U" shape relationship between the rural-urban income gap and agricultural growth and we will discuss it further in the next section.
The effects of other factors do not show much change. The sown area remains the most important production factor across different regions. The fertilizer contributes most to the grain output while least to the output value of farming in the middle region. The reason is that the greatest diverting effect in this region requires the farmer using more fertilizer to substitute labour. The agricultural machine power contributes more to the output value of farming than to the grain output because it is not directly used for agricultural production but for agricultural transportation due to the scattered land property right. The irrigated area does not significantly contribute to the agricultural growth in the middle region, which may be also result from the largest diverting effect in this region so that the farmers do not want to invest in the land quality, or result from the better initial infrastructure in this region which needs less investment in the irrigation system.
The trace of the "grabbing hand" of financial deficit is spotted except in the west region because the central government transfers more income to this least developed region. Extra income sources do help to alleviate the grabbing hand also except in the west region. The explanation for this is that because in this region the chance for absorbing FDI is small and the real estate industry is less developed to fund for the financial deficit, and thus both the income sources are irrelevant to alleviating the grabbing hand and thus do not take effect on agricultural growth. In accordance with the results by regions, the total data estimation shows that the "U shape"
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relationship does exist between the rural-urban income gap and agricultural growth. The negative coefficient of the rural-urban income gap and the positive coefficient of the quadratic term mean that there is a minimum value and the agricultural output first decreases and then increases as the rural-urban income gap. According to the fourth and eight column of table 6, given other factors, the critical value of the rural-urban income gap towards the output value of farming is 1.7, and that towards the grain output is 1.37.
This kind of "U shape" relationship may be explained as follows. Firstly, the general human capital in the west region are so low that the farmer cannot swift to nonfarm sector and thus produce smaller diverting effect. Secondly, because the central government transfer more capital to support the west, the higher rural-urban income gap in this region may not lead to great adverse effect on agriculture. Thirdly, according to the results by periods that the diverting effect of the rural-urban income gap decreases as time, this means the even higher rural-urban gap produces smaller diverting effects. The above reasons result in that the higher rural-urban income gap may not lead to lower agricultural growth for the total data but the negative relationship still exists in sub data. This "U shape" relationship is consistent with the results by periods and by regions.
Concluding Remarks
This paper uses China's provincial data since economic reform to investigate the relationship between the rural-urban income gap and agricultural growth. The increasing rural-urban income gap resulting from the persistent urban bias may produce diverting effect on agriculture by both transferring the rural labour force to the nonfarm sector and weakening farmer's incentive to invest in agricultural production. This process undermines agricultural growth. The empirical test does show that the current rural-urban income gap produces a significant diverting effects on four major production factors with the total elasticity reduction of 0.59 to the output value of farming and 0.44 to the grain output, but the one-year lagged effect of the rural-urban income gap is only significant to grain output with a smaller coefficient of -0.181. The results also show that this effect on the output value of farming is decreasing over time but the effect on the grain output is persistent over time, and that the middle provinces suffers much greater diverting effect than other provinces because the middle provinces are major supplier of rural labour. This period and regional studies are further confirmed to be a "U shape" relationship between the rural-urban income gap and the agricultural growth.
Our findings deny the term of "rural surplus labour" in the classical dualism theory by Lewis (1954) and his followers (such as Ranis, 1964 and Harris and Torrado, 1970) , because the rural-urban income gap is confirmed to produce outstanding diverting effect on agricultural growth. This would not happen if the rural migrants are really surplus. Those institutional arrangements such as the rural-urban separated registration system and the restrictions on the free transaction of farmlands, cause the persistent rural-urban income gap which further result in the agricultural resources diverted out. The farmlands are out of use and the agricultural infrastructure is lack of maintenance. Also due to those institutional obstacles, the dual economy between the rural and urban sector cannot transfer to be an integrated economy and the rural-urban income gap keeps expanding, although there are remarkable rural migrants.
China's agriculture has experienced from the so called "food problem" towards the stage of "agricultural adjustment", similar to Japanese experience on agricultural development (see Hayami, 1988: chapter 2) . Now China is transferring from the urban bias towards the agricultural or rural bias at least at the central government level. Besides the central government's support for agricultural development, it is necessary to change the incentive schema on the local government through political democratization or increase the role of agricultural performance in local governments' promotion. In addition, the persistent ruralurban separated registration system (Hukou System) also has to be removed in order to reduce the number of labour force in the agricultural sectors and give the rural migrants the equal rights as those urban citizens. The small amount of farmers as well as agricultural cooperatives will facilitate farmers' collective actions and press on the government by lobbying activities in order to form the policy in favour of agriculture. Given the prevailing agricultural protection in the world, such a stack of system readjustments may result in the decrease of the rural-urban income gap and thus cultivate China's agricultural competitiveness in the world's fierce food market.
hand on agriculture deficit), we use their absolute value to take logs and then put the negative sign ahead the log sign. 
